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Will There Be a Neurolaw Revolution? 
ADAM J. KOLBER∗ 
The central debate in the field of neurolaw has focused on two claims. Joshua 
Greene and Jonathan Cohen argue that we do not have free will and that advances 
in neuroscience will eventually lead us to stop blaming people for their actions. 
Stephen Morse, by contrast, argues that we have free will and that the kind of 
advances Greene and Cohen envision will not and should not affect the law. I 
argue that neither side has persuasively made the case for or against a revolution 
in the way the law treats responsibility. 
There will, however, be a neurolaw revolution of a different sort. It will not 
necessarily arise from radical changes in our beliefs about criminal responsibility 
but from a wave of new brain technologies that will change society and the law in 
many ways, three of which I describe here: First, as new methods of brain imaging 
improve our ability to measure distress, the law will ease limitations on recoveries 
for emotional injuries. Second, as neuroimaging gives us better methods of 
inferring people’s thoughts, we will have more laws to protect thought privacy but 
less actual thought privacy. Finally, improvements in artificial intelligence will 
systematically change how law is written and interpreted.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The central debate in the field of neurolaw has focused on two claims. On the 
one hand, Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen argue that we do not have free will.1 
We are just mechanisms in the universe subject to the laws of nature who should 
not be held morally responsible for our actions.2 They predict that advances in 
neuroscience will lead to a revolution in which the law stops deeming people 
responsible for their conduct.3 On the other hand, Stephen Morse argues that we 
have free will because moral responsibility is compatible with our mechanistic 
nature.4 He argues that the kind of advances in neuroscience that Greene and Cohen 
envision will not and should not affect the law.5 
In my view, neither side has persuasively made the case for or against a 
neurolaw revolution. As to whether the law ought to change, neither Greene and 
Cohen nor Morse purport to offer new solutions to end the millennia-old debate 
about free will. As to whether our legal system will in fact change, both sides have 
yet to muster sufficient support. Greene and Cohen speculate that neuroscience will 
change our views about free will but offer little more than a thumbnail sketch of 
how and why those changes will occur. Morse claims that the law is at least partly 
insulated from the changes Greene and Cohen envision because the law holds us 
responsible in ways that are immune to evidence of mechanism.6 While Morse may 
be right, he fails to exclude other plausible interpretations of current law.  
While neither side of the debate has convincingly predicted how we will 
understand responsibility in the future, I claim that there will indeed be a neurolaw 
revolution. It may arise not from radical changes in our beliefs about criminal 
responsibility but from a wave of new brain technologies that will change society 
and the law in a wide variety of ways.  
The precise nature of a technology-driven neurolaw revolution is difficult to 
predict, but I present three plausible hypotheses: First, as new methods of brain 
imaging improve our ability to measure distress, the law will ease limitations on 
recoveries for emotional injuries. Second, as neuroimaging gives us better methods 
of inferring the thoughts of others, we will have more laws to protect thought 
privacy but less actual thought privacy. And finally, improvements in artificial 
intelligence will systematically change how law is written and interpreted. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and 
Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B 1775, 1776 (2004). 
 2. Id. at 1781. 
 3. Id. at 1776. 
 4. Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A 
Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 402 (2006) (“Many thorough-going naturalists, 
such as myself, who believe that all the phenomena of the universe are causally explicable 
by natural physical laws, believe that responsibility is compatible with determinism, a 
position termed ‘compatibilism.’”). 
 5. See Stephen J. Morse, Neuroscience and the Future of Personhood and 
Responsibility, in CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 113, 122 
(Jeffrey Rosen & Benjamin Wittes eds., 2011).  
 6. See id. at 119 (stating that contra-causal “free will plays no doctrinal role in criminal 
law and is not genuinely foundational for criminal responsibility”). 
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I. A WEAK CASE FOR A RESPONSIBILITY REVOLUTION 
A. The Free Will Impasse 
The problem of free will is often understood as a conflict between determinism 
and responsibility. In a deterministic universe, the state of the universe today 
depends only on the state of the universe at some other point in time and on 
nonrandom laws of nature.7 If we live in such a universe, we could, in principle, 
predict at the time of the Big Bang that you would eventually come into existence 
and read this sentence right now.8 You may feel like you could have chosen 
otherwise, but in a deterministic universe, there is no possibility that you would, in 
fact, be doing something else right now. 
Some believe that if we live in a deterministic world, we have no free will.9 You 
could not have freely chosen to read this Article, they argue, if the universe allows 
for no alternative possibilities. Given that you were caused to read it by forces 
beyond your control, it makes no sense to deem you responsible for doing so. And 
if you are not responsible for your choices, then murderers are not responsible for 
theirs.10 They too are victims of forces beyond their control. We might be justified 
in confining and rehabilitating them and trying to deter similar conduct by others. 
But we do not have grounds to deem them responsible for their crimes and ought 
not seek retribution. 
As it happens, most scientists believe the universe is not deterministic.11 Some 
physical events, like the decay of radioactive atoms, are truly random. We may 
know the average rates at which atoms decay, but the precise timing cannot 
possibly be predicted. But even if some events are truly indeterministic, we still 
have no control over them. We may be unable to perfectly predict when you will 
finish reading this sentence, but you are not responsible for the billions of 
sometimes randomly colliding particles that make you finish it when you do: How 
can we be responsible for actions that follow mechanistically from forces beyond 
our control? Thus, much of the conflict over free will can be framed in terms of 
mechanism. If we are mechanisms—like clocks that tick but have no moral 
agency—we arguably cannot be responsible at all.  
I will focus on three views about free will that are most pertinent to debates in 
neurolaw (and I will depart somewhat from traditional practice by describing their 
relationships to mechanism rather than determinism).12 According to “free will 
                                                                                                                 
 
 7. Cf. JOHN MARTIN FISCHER, ROBERT KANE, DERK PEREBOOM & MANUAL VARGAS, 
FOUR VIEWS ON FREE WILL 2 (2007) (“Something is deterministic if it has only one 
physically possible outcome.”); Gary Watson, Introduction to FREE WILL 1, 2 (Gary Watson 
ed., 1982).  
 8. GALEN STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND BELIEF 4 (rev. ed., 2010) (describing the 
“stronger” notion of determinism). 
 9. See, e.g., Greene & Cohen, supra note 1, at 1777. 
 10. See id. (arguing that we should “recognize that free will . . . is an illusion and 
structure our society accordingly by rejecting retributivist legal principles that derive their 
intuitive force from [an illusion of responsibility]”). 
 11. FISCHER ET AL., supra note 7, at 2. 
 12. For more traditional descriptions, see, for example, STRAWSON, supra note 8, at 4–7 
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skeptics,” we cannot be morally responsible because moral responsibility is 
incompatible with mechanism, and we live in a mechanistic universe. Therefore, 
we are never responsible for our actions.  
“Libertarians,” as I will use the term,13 agree that responsibility and mechanism 
are incompatible. They hold, however, that the universe is not mechanistic in the 
way that I presented, so we can still be responsible for our actions. I focus on those 
libertarians who believe we have free will because our souls make choices 
independent of the forces of the universe that govern mere things. While there are 
sophisticated forms of libertarianism that don’t rely on souls,14 I focus on 
soul-based libertarian theories because they are endangered by scientific advances 
that explain human behavior without relying on the notion of a soul.  
Finally, “compatibilists,” hold that moral responsibility is consistent with 
mechanism. On this view, even if our beliefs and intentions are caused by factors 
beyond our control, so long as we are rational creatures (or have certain other 
features compatibilists care about),15 we can still be responsible for our actions. 
There are, of course, other views related to free will, and the three I focus on 
have numerous variations. Yet the millennia-old debate about free will shows no 
signs of ending soon. Indeed, the debate has reached something of an impasse. 
B. Greene and Cohen’s Normative Claim 
In a 2003 paper, Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen stepped into the fray. 
Greene and Cohen are free will skeptics who spend much of the paper defending 
the normative claim that we should stop holding people responsible for their 
actions and try to banish the retributivist impulses that guide much of the criminal 
justice system.16 If they are right, we should radically change not only criminal law 
but other areas of the law that appear to require responsibility, including contract 
and tort law.17 Given its dramatic implications, Greene and Cohen’s paper has 
caught the attention of many legal scholars18 and shaped a substantial part of the 
debate in neurolaw.19  
The attention in legal circles focuses almost exclusively on Greene and Cohen’s 
defense of free will skepticism.20 But as they readily acknowledge, their normative 
                                                                                                                 
and Watson, supra note 7, at 1–11. 
 13. The “libertarian” label in free will contexts is unrelated to its usage in political 
contexts. 
 14. Watson, supra note 7, at 11. 
 15. See, e.g., HARRY G. FRANKFURT, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 
in THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT 11, 19–25 (1988) (claiming that even 
mechanistic actions can be freely willed if an individual is capable of developing second-
order desires about his first-order desires).  
 16. Greene & Cohen, supra note 1, at 1776. 
 17. See Morse, supra note 5, at 121. 
 18. See, e.g., Michael S. Pardo & Dennis Patterson, Neuroscience, Normativity, and 
Retributivism, in THE FUTURE OF PUNISHMENT 133, 134–35 (Thomas Nadelhoffer ed., 2013); 
O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 1265, 1299–338 (2007). 
 19. A search of Westlaw’s Journal and Law Review (JLR) database on November 22, 
2013 returned seventy-one hits for “Greene /p Cohen /p neuroscience.” 
 20. See, e.g., Pardo & Patterson, supra note 18; Snead, supra note 18. 
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claims about free will essentially just rehash familiar arguments in a longstanding 
debate that has raged for centuries.21 Greene and Cohen certainly provide an 
opportunity to reconsider these age-old questions. But, as far as I can tell, they 
make no new contributions to the philosophical debate about free will, nor do they 
purport to do so.  
C. Greene and Cohen’s Prediction 
Greene and Cohen make a different claim, however, that has received almost no 
attention from legal scholars. They predict that, as neuroscience vividly 
demonstrates the mechanistic nature of our behavior, people will be less inclined to 
blame criminals and more inclined to punish on consequentialist grounds. This 
prediction is the central focus of their abstract, which states in pertinent part: 
We argue that neuroscience will probably have a transformative effect 
on the law, despite the fact that existing legal doctrine can, in principle, 
accommodate whatever neuroscience will tell us. New neuroscience 
will change the law, not by undermining its current assumptions, but by 
transforming people’s moral intuitions about free will and 
responsibility. This change in moral outlook will result not from the 
discovery of crucial new facts or clever new arguments, but from a new 
appreciation of old arguments, bolstered by vivid new illustrations 
provided by cognitive neuroscience. We foresee, and recommend, a 
shift away from punishment aimed at retribution in favour of a more 
progressive, consequentialist approach to the criminal law.22 
Thus, they predict that as people become more vividly acquainted with the 
mechanistic nature of human decision making, they will find retributivist 
punishment increasingly unpalatable and adopt consequentialist punishment 
practices instead. Except when they mention that they recommend the 
transformation they predict, the abstract focuses exclusively on prediction. 
Greene and Cohen’s prediction is not entirely original either. As they 
recognize,23 Robert Wright made much the same claim in 1994.24 But this vision of 
the future has not received much attention, and Greene and Cohen certainly add to 
it. In particular, they offer the following thought experiment:  
                                                                                                                 
 
 21. See Greene & Cohen, supra note 1, at 1776–77 (“We . . . consider the standard 
responses to the philosophical problem of free will. . . . The problem of free will is old and 
has many formulations.”) (citation omitted); id. at 1783 (“[W]e should briefly address some 
standard concerns about the rejection of free will and conceptions of responsibility that 
depend on it.”); cf. id. at 1775 (“New neuroscience will affect the way we view the law, not 
by furnishing us with new ideas or arguments about the nature of human action, but by 
breathing new life into old ones.”). 
 22. Greene & Cohen, supra note 1, at 1775. 
 23. Id. at 1781. 
 24. See ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND 
EVERYDAY LIFE 351–56 (1994).  
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Imagine, for example, watching a film of your brain choosing between 
soup and salad. The analysis software highlights the neurons pushing 
for soup in red and the neurons pushing for salad in blue. You zoom in 
and slow down the film, allowing yourself to trace the cause-and-effect 
relationships between individual neurons—the mind’s clockwork 
revealed in arbitrary detail. You find the tipping-point moment at which 
the blue neurons in your prefrontal cortex out-fire the red neurons, 
seizing control of your pre-motor cortex and causing you to say, ‘I will 
have the salad, please’. 
 At some further point this sort of brainware may be very 
widespread, with a high-resolution brain scanner in every classroom. 
People may grow up completely used to the idea that every decision is 
a thoroughly mechanical process, the outcome of which is completely 
determined by the results of prior mechanical processes. What will such 
people think as they sit in their jury boxes? Suppose a man has killed 
his wife in a jealous rage. Will jurors of the future wonder whether the 
defendant acted in that moment of his own free will? Will they wonder 
if it was really him who killed his wife rather than his uncontrollable 
anger? Will they ask whether he could have done otherwise? Whether 
he really deserves to be punished, or if he is just a victim of unfortunate 
circumstances? We submit that these questions, which seem so 
important today, will lose their grip in an age when the mechanical 
nature of human decision-making is fully appreciated. The law will 
continue to punish misdeeds, as it must for practical reasons, but the 
idea of distinguishing the truly, deeply guilty from those who are 
merely victims of neuronal circumstances will, we submit, seem 
pointless.25 
Thus, Greene and Cohen make an “empirical prediction that may or may not hold: 
as more and more scientific facts come in, providing increasingly vivid illustrations 
of what the human mind is really like, more and more people will develop moral 
intuitions that are at odds with our current social practices.”26 
Granted, the truth about free will may bear on their prediction. If you agree with 
Greene and Cohen that mechanism and moral responsibility are incompatible and 
you expect others to acquire the correct belief over time, then you have some 
reason to believe in their prediction. But even if a belief is true, there is no 
guarantee that others will come to adopt it. You may hold particular religious 
beliefs, but the truth or falsity of your beliefs tells us little about whether others will 
come to agree with you. To properly evaluate Greene and Cohen’s prediction, we 
must consider evidence from history, psychology, anthropology, religion, and 
more. But while these nonphilosophical considerations are critical to their 
prediction, Greene and Cohen say little about them.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 25. Greene & Cohen, supra note 1, at 1781 (emphasis in original). 
 26. Id. at 1781 (citation omitted). 
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D. Where Their Prediction Needs Strengthening 
I am sympathetic to Greene and Cohen’s vision of the future. As they and others 
continue to gather evidence bearing on their prediction,27 here are three areas where 
their prediction is most in need of further evidence or clarification:  
1. The Thought Experiment Is Weak 
The soup-or-salad thought experiment is the principal tool Greene and Cohen 
use to persuade us that people’s beliefs will in fact change. They ask us to imagine 
watching a film of our brains while choosing between soup and salad. As we come 
to understand the cause-and-effect relationships between our neurons and our 
ultimate soup-or-salad response, we are supposedly led to see ourselves as 
automata rather than as freely willed agents. 
It is hardly clear, though, that the proposed illustration—were it possible to 
create—would have the effect they envision. There is no question that we feel like 
we have free will. If the imagined scanner works in real time (as Greene and Cohen 
imply), then as we feel inclined to pick soup, we will see the scanner reflect our 
inclinations. So long as the scanner merely shows how our soup-or-salad response 
is mediated by our character or preferences, it will not alienate us from our sense of 
having free will. We would not be disappointed to learn that on hot days we choose 
salad over soup. The fact that temperature affects our food preferences does not 
undermine our sense of free will. Moreover, if we could test the machine’s 
accuracy by deliberately changing our inclinations and watching the machine 
reflect what feels like a genuine change of preference, then the imagined scanner 
might even reinforce our sense of having free will. 
The soup-or-salad demonstration might have more bite if it showed how our 
choice was dictated by factors entirely external to us, such as the state of the world 
before our births. Such a machine might be immune to my suggestion that we test it 
by changing our inclinations, since the machine would have predicted the flip-flop 
in advance. But the causal path from before our births until our soup-or-salad 
decisions would be so complicated that we humans would be unable to appreciate 
the pathways. Maybe we would only comprehend a small part of the mechanism in 
a way that never packs the epiphanic punch that Greene and Cohen imagine.  
Moreover, Greene and Cohen speak of a brain scanner, not a “world scanner.” 
Predictions that precede our birth would require the machine to know not only the 
detailed contents of our brains but also the state of the rest of the world. Even a 
machine that made short-term predictions would need to know more than just the 
contents of our brains since a passing breeze moments before deciding could cause 
you to switch from soup to salad. No one anticipates seeing a “world scanner,” 
except perhaps in the most distant future, and it may be impossible to build in 
principle (the universe might end before the pertinent calculations could be made). 
                                                                                                                 
 
 27. See E-mail from Joshua Greene, John and Ruth Hazel Assoc. Prof. of the Social 
Sciences, Harvard Univ. Dep’t of Psychology, to author (Oct. 2, 2013, 05:16 PM) (on file 
with author) (describing an unpublished research study supporting the view that exposure to 
the neuroscience of decisionmaking reduces retributive impulses). 
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Hence, it’s not clear that the kind of brain scanner they discuss would really 
persuade. Even vivid neuroscientific displays from the distant future might fail to 
convince us to become free will skeptics.  
2. Recent History Does Not Clearly Support Their Prediction 
Though the kind of neurotechnology in the soup-or-salad hypothetical is still far 
away, neuroscientists have made remarkable progress over the last several decades 
in understanding the brain. Along the way, they have already conducted several 
experiments that, like the soup-or-salad brain scanner, seem to vividly remind us 
that we are mechanisms. Yet these vivid displays have yet to change the legal 
system in any obvious ways. 
In the 1960s, for example, neuroscientist Jose Delgado inserted devices into the 
brains of animals that he used to control their actions.28 In one dramatic episode, a 
bull charged at Delgado until, moments before the anticipated impact, Delgado 
pressed a button on a radio transmitter that activated a device in the bull’s brain and 
caused it to stop.29 A front-page story in the New York Times called it “probably the 
most spectacular demonstration ever performed of the deliberate modification of 
animal behavior through external control of the brain.”30 
By showing that we can neuroscientifically manipulate a bull’s behavior, its 
brain arguably seems more like a mechanism and less like something that enables 
free choice. And since we could in principle do the same demonstration with 
humans, our brains also seem more like mechanisms and less like enablers of free 
choice. According to Greene and Cohen, such vivid demonstrations of mechanism 
are supposed to make our traditional notions of responsibility seem suspect, but 
they offer no evidence that experiments like Delgado’s actually did. 
In the early 1980s, Benjamin Libet and colleagues began reporting experiments 
on the timing of our intentions to act using electrodes on the scalp to measure brain 
activity.31 Subjects were instructed to press a button whenever they felt like it and 
to note the position of a fast-moving clock hand when they decided to press it.32 
Roughly 350 to 800 milliseconds before subjects were consciously aware that they 
intended to press the button, researchers consistently detected distinctive brain 
activity signaling that a button press was imminent.33 In other words, we can 
predict that a subject is about to press a button before the subject himself.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 28. See, e.g., John Horgan, The Forgotten Era of Brain Chips, SCI. AM., Oct. 1, 2005, at 
66, 67–68.  
 29. Id. at 69–70. 
 30. John A. Osmundsen, ‘Matador’ With a Radio Stops Wired Bull, N.Y. TIMES, May 
17, 1965, at A1. 
 31. See Benjamin Libet, Curtis A. Gleason, Elwood W. Wright & Dennis K. Pearl, Time 
of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-
Potential): The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act, 106 BRAIN 623 (1983); 
DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL 50–55 (2002). 
 32. Libet et al., supra note 31, at 624. 
 33. Id. at 623. 
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Supposing the Libet experiments really demonstrate the phenomena just 
described,34 the results should come as no surprise to mechanists.35 Thought 
processes require brain activity. We cannot develop an intention—including the 
intention to press a button—without some prior brain activity to instantiate the 
intention. Nevertheless, vividly seeing how unconscious brain activity precedes 
mental activity reminds us that we are mechanisms: we don’t need to postulate a 
first-moving soul to explain how we make decisions. 
Nevertheless, experiments like those of Libet and Delgado have not obviously 
led to a neurolaw revolution. If Greene and Cohen are correct that vivid 
illustrations of brain mechanisms lead to societal reductions in retributive impulses, 
we would plausibly expect retributive sentiments to have declined over the last 
several decades. Yet, Greene and Cohen cite no such data.  
Indeed, the United States has grown increasingly punitive in recent decades,36 a 
period that largely coincides with the development in neuroscience of more vivid 
illustrations of brain mechanism. The data are surely ambiguous: crime is 
constantly changing in frequency and severity, and societal retributivist impulses 
may be getting weaker as incentives to achieve instrumental goals like deterrence 
and incapacitation are getting stronger. At least among law professors, however, 
the last several decades have seen a rebirth in retributivist scholarship: 
Thirty years ago, a new generation of philosophers demanded a 
criminal law founded on blame—on unembarrassed condemnation 
where condemnation is warranted. They have made themselves 
dominant on the American philosophical scene, both in our analysis of 
substantive doctrine and in our general understanding of the propriety 
of criminal punishment. Indeed, we have had nothing less than a 
renaissance of retributivist punishment philosophy . . . .37 
The rebirth in retributivist scholarship largely coincides with these more vivid 
illustrations of brain mechanism. Nevertheless, Greene and Cohen never say 
whether existing, fairly vivid illustrations of mechanism in neuroscience, genetics, 
and social psychology have had an impact on our criminal justice policies. If those 
illustrations have had little impact, then Greene and Cohen should explain why.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 34. For doubts about the standard interpretation of Libet’s experiments, see, for 
example, Aaron Schurger, Jacobo D. Sitt & Stanislas Dehaene, An Accumulator Model for 
Spontaneous Neural Activity Prior to Self-Initiated Movement, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 
U.S. AM., at E2904 (2012). 
 35. Cf. Neil Levy, Libet’s Impossible Demand, 12 J. CONSCIOUSNESS STUD. 67, 68 
(2005) (“We do not need experimental results to show that we do not exercise the kind of 
control that seems to be at issue in the debate over Libet’s experiments.”). 
 36. James Q. Whitman, A Plea Against Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 85 
(2003) (“[T]he United States has embarked on a campaign of intensifying harshness in 
criminal punishment over the last three decades or so.”). 
 37. Id. at 87. 
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3. The Path to Social Change Is Unclear 
Perhaps the most serious critique of Greene and Cohen’s prediction is that they 
never give a clear explanation of how vivid neuroscience demonstrations are 
supposed to change people’s views in a manner subsequently reflected in the law. 
The soup-or-salad thought experiment purports to describe an effect on laypeople’s 
views. It seems, at least at first, that we are to imagine a kind of grassroots support 
for a mechanistic view of the world. Presumably, laws will change because 
lawmakers and their constituents will no longer view crime in retributivist terms. 
But as Greene and Cohen readily acknowledge, “Our intuitive sense of free will 
runs quite deep, and it is possible that we will never be able to fully talk ourselves 
out of it.”38 “[O]ne might wonder,” they note, “whether one can so much as make a 
decision without implicitly assuming that one is free to choose among one’s 
apparent options.”39 They even marshal considerable empirical research that 
recognizes the deep-seated nature of our retributive impulses: 
Regarding responsibility and punishment, one might wonder if it is 
humanly possible to deny our retributive impulses. This challenge is 
bolstered by recent work in the behavioural sciences suggesting that an 
intuitive sense of fairness runs deep in our primate lineage and that an 
adaptive tendency towards retributive punishment may have been a 
crucial development in the biological and cultural evolution of human 
sociality. . . . If retributivism runs that deep and is that useful, one 
might wonder whether we have any serious hope of, or reason for, 
getting rid of it. Have we any real choice but to see one another as free 
agents who deserve to be rewarded and punished for our past 
behaviours?40 
Precisely because our retributivist impulses are so strong, we may adopt, as 
Chris Kaposy has suggested, various strategies to cordon off beliefs that are in 
conflict. Kaposy notes, for example, that even if science does show that free will is 
an illusion, people may resist adopting perspectives that challenge deep aspects of 
their identity, perhaps the way some theists resist evidence of evolution.41 Or, 
people might isolate their views about science from the ways in which they conduct 
their daily lives.42 
In fact, however, Greene and Cohen at least briefly addressed Kaposy’s 
concerns in their paper by noting that they do not necessarily envision a popular 
uprising against retributivist criminal law. Rather, they note, expert decision 
makers will use their belief in mechanism to rid the law of its ancient retributive 
impulses: 
                                                                                                                 
 
 38. Greene & Cohen, supra note 1, at 1781. 
 39. Id. at 1784. 
 40. Id. (citations omitted). 
 41. Chris Kaposy, Will Neuroscientific Discoveries About Free Will and Selfhood 
Change our Ethical Practices?, 2 NEUROETHICS 51, 53–54 (2009). 
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[M]odern physics tells us that space is curved. Nevertheless, it may be 
impossible for us to see the world as anything other than flatly 
Euclidean in our day-to-day lives. . . . Does it then follow that we are 
forever bound by our innate Euclidean psychology? The answer 
depends on the domain of life in question. In navigating the aisles of 
the grocery store, an intuitive, Euclidean representation of space is not 
only adequate, but probably inevitable. However, when we are, for 
example, planning the launch of a spacecraft, we can and should make 
use of relativistic physical principles that are less intuitive but more 
accurate. In other words, . . . [f]or most day-to-day purposes it may be 
pointless or impossible to view ourselves or others in this detached sort 
of way. But—and this is the crucial point—it may not be pointless or 
impossible to adopt this perspective when one is deciding what the 
criminal law should be or whether a given defendant should be put to 
death for his crimes.43 
Greene and Cohen correctly point out that we can, at least in principle, 
recognize biases in our decision making and overcome them in special contexts. 
This response raises questions, however, about the arguments supporting their 
prediction. The vivid neuroscience displays that are supposed to change people’s 
minds operate more at the level of gut instinct than rational thought. Are the expert 
decision makers who set criminal justice policy swayed merely by vividness? If 
they are, why think that the vivid illustrations of neuroscience will speak to them 
more strongly than their deep retributive impulses? Alternatively, if they are not 
swayed by gut instincts and vivid illustrations, then why expect their views to 
change in the future?  
Perhaps some dynamic account of political power, legal expertise, and laypeople 
preferences could put the pieces together. Perhaps there are experts who will 
support the changes Greene and Cohen recommend when there is more political 
will to make it a reality. Greene and Cohen’s prediction is unconvincing, however, 
until they explain why wise decision makers are swayed more by vivid displays 
than by instinctual retributive impulses. 
Even if their prediction comes true, more argument is necessary to show that we 
will adopt the consequentialist policies Greene and Cohen endorse. Perhaps people 
will be inclined to abolish punishment or punish under some entirely different 
nonretributivist justification.44 Thus, Greene and Cohen leave us with no clear 
sense as to why the future they envision is likely to eventuate.  
4. Ways to Bolster Their Prediction 
There are several avenues of research that could potentially bolster Greene and 
Cohen’s prediction. First, I have noted that, at least among legal scholars, there is 
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Irrational NeuroLaw Exuberance: A Plea for Neuromodesty, 62 MERCER L. REV. 837, 856 
(2011). And even if they were, as a predictive matter, people may or may not adopt 
conclusions that are entailed by their other beliefs. 
818 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 89:807 
 
little evidence that advances in neuroscience have so far dampened enthusiasm for 
retributivist punishment. But the claim warrants further attention. Greene and 
Cohen could argue that as vivid as the Libet-style experiments are, they are still 
insufficiently vivid to kick-start a neurolaw revolution. Moreover, over the last 
several years, a growing number of writers, many of them scientists, have taken the 
position that neuroscience should change our criminal justice practices.45 Perhaps 
we are merely waiting for a tipping-point change in public opinion. Importantly, 
since the publication of Greene and Cohen’s paper, the Supreme Court has begun 
citing neuroscience research on issues related to culpability.46 The neuroscience 
data in such cases may be offered simply to support conclusions reached by the 
Justices on other grounds, and either way, the Court has issued not the slightest 
inkling that all attributions of legal responsibility are in jeopardy. But if such trends 
continue, they provide some support for Greene and Cohen’s prediction.  
Second, we need a more detailed account of how vivid illustrations change the 
entrenched beliefs of both laypeople and experts. Some recent experiments suggest 
that people induced to disbelieve in free will are more willing to cheat47 and less 
inclined to help others in laboratory settings.48 These studies provide at least some 
evidence that information about free will and responsibility can change beliefs and 
actions. But the observed effects are presumably temporary. The researchers who 
conducted these studies were probably not afraid that subjects leaving their 
laboratories were going to be more dishonest and unhelpful than they were before 
the experiment. Exactly how the vivid illustrations Greene and Cohen discuss 
would affect us, though, is an area ripe for further investigation. 
Third, we can probably envision thought experiments more persuasive than the 
soup-or-salad example. For example, imagine a pill that, for a two-hour period, 
makes us temporarily addicted to some drug. The experience of taking the pill 
might make us more sympathetic to addicts. We might find their cravings so 
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powerful that we decide they should not be held fully responsible for their 
behavior. While such pills would neither eliminate retributive impulses nor 
demonstrate that free will does not exist, they might do more than the soup-or-salad 
example to alter views about punishment.  
Fourth, research into other “responsibility revolutions” could bolster Greene and 
Cohen’s prediction. For example, during the last millennium, there have been 
numerous instances in which nonhuman animals, like pigs and moles, have been 
put on trial and sentenced for crimes of various sorts. In The Criminal Prosecution 
and Capital Punishment of Animals,49 E.P. Evans described more than two hundred 
such trials from 824 to 1906, spanning Europe and many other parts of the world, 
including the United States,50 and it is likely that he discovered just a small fraction 
of the trials actually conducted.  
It is difficult to know whether people who participated in animal trials really 
considered animals morally responsible. Researchers Dorothy Cheney and 
Robert Seyfarth believe participants did: “People in the Middle Ages were not 
careless anthropomorphizers; they clearly recognized that animals were not people. 
Nevertheless, the behavior of their animals often led people to believe that animals 
could be aware of what they did and held accountable for their acts.”51 
Paul Berman agrees, arguing that “[t]he historical evidence indicates that 
communities viewed these trials seriously” and “jurists and philosophers debated 
the propriety of holding animals responsible for crimes.”52 As evidence, Berman 
notes that trial practices of the day seem consistent with the view that people were 
actually trying to determine whether a particular animal or group of animals was 
criminally culpable: 
The prosecution was represented by professional advocates, and 
defense lawyers were also hired. Witnesses and evidence were heard 
prior to judgment. And though the animals were usually found guilty, 
such a verdict was certainly not assured. For example, in 1457, the 
sucklings of a sow that had murdered a five-year-old child were 
included in the indictment. They had been found at the scene of the 
crime stained with blood, but “in lack of any positive proof that they 
had assisted in mangling the deceased, they were restored to their 
owner, on condition that he should give bail for their appearance, 
should further evidence be forthcoming to prove their complicity in 
their mother’s crime.” Likewise, in 1750 at Vanvres, France, a man and 
a donkey, discovered in an act of copulation, were both charged with 
bestiality, but while the man was sentenced to death, the donkey was 
subsequently acquitted on the ground that she was the victim of 
violence and had not participated in her master’s crime of her own free 
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will. At the trial, the defense had presented a statement signed by many 
inhabitants of the community stating that they had known the donkey 
for four years, and that “she had always shown herself to be virtuous 
and well-behaved both at home and abroad and had never given 
occasion of scandal to anyone, and that therefore, ‘they were willing to 
bear witness that she is in word and deed and in all her habits of life a 
most honest creature.’” This document seems to have had a decisive 
influence upon the judgment of the court.53 
Now such practices seem incomprehensible. The ways in which our views have 
changed about the responsibility of nonhuman animals (or of criminally insane 
humans) may tell us a lot about the nature of responsibility revolutions like the one 
that Greene and Cohen predict.54 
II. A WEAK CASE THAT LAW IS INSULATED FROM REVOLUTION 
Unlike Greene and Cohen, Stephen Morse is a compatibilist. He believes that 
the universe is mechanistic55 but that we can still be morally responsible.56 Morse 
also disagrees with Greene and Cohen’s prediction. He believes “the dystopia that 
Greene and Cohen predict is not likely to come to pass” because “[t]here is little 
reason at present to believe that we are not agents.”57  
On Morse’s view, it is a mistake to excuse a person’s conduct simply because 
his brain “made him” do it. Essentially all of our actions are caused by our brains, 
but unless a person lacks the requisite capacity to be rational or has some other 
excuse, Morse believes he can nevertheless be held responsible. Thinking a person 
excused merely because his behavior was caused evinces what Morse 
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tongue-in-cheek calls “brain overclaim syndrome.”58 People have brain overclaim 
syndrome when they accept that we are sometimes responsible for our behavior but 
nevertheless believe that any brain-based causal explanation of behavior is 
exculpatory.59 (Of course, if free will skeptics like Greene and Cohen are right, then 
Morse is suffering from what we might call “brain underclaim syndrome,” by 
failing to recognize that mechanism is always exculpatory.) 
A. Legal Presuppositions About Responsibility 
Morse’s central contribution to neurolaw, however, does not concern his 
substantive views about free will. Like Greene and Cohen, he does not purport to 
offer new arguments to resolve the free will impasse. His central contribution 
concerns the relationship between law and advances in neuroscience. He argues 
that to the extent neuroscience merely gives us a fuller picture of brain 
mechanisms, it ought not affect the law because the law does not require us to be 
the ultimate physical cause of our behavior.60  
Provided we have no excusing condition like insanity, the law deems us 
responsible for our actions because, Morse writes, “the law’s official position” is 
“that conscious, intentional, rational, and uncompelled agents may properly be held 
responsible.”61 According to Morse, “[t]he law treats persons generally as 
intentional creatures and not simply as mechanistic forces . . . .”62 Legal doctrine is 
not framed in neuroscientific terms but in the more familiar language of beliefs, 
desires, and intentions.63 Neuroscience could justify radical revisions to the law on 
Morse’s view if it were able to show that “humans are not intentional creatures who 
act for reasons and whose mental states play a causal role in their behavior.”64 But 
being the ultimate physical cause of our own behavior is not “a criterion of any 
civil or criminal law doctrine.”65 
In addition to defending compatibilism as a normative matter, Morse makes 
positive claims about the law and finds a special affinity between compatibilism 
and current law.66 He does not explicitly deem the law fundamentally compatibilist, 
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though he seems amenable to the possibility and excludes certain noncompatibilist 
interpretations.67 If current law is rooted in compatibilist presuppositions, a 
responsibility revolution would be less likely. A fundamentally compatibilist 
criminal law would be insulated from advances in neuroscience that merely 
elucidate brain mechanism. The current state of the law would slow the path to 
revolution.  
Indeed, the law may presuppose Morse’s compatibilist view of free will. Surely 
it is generally consistent with compatibilism as it holds us responsible without 
explicitly worrying about whether or not we are mechanisms. But there is a 
difference between being consistent with a particular theory and being 
fundamentally committed to the theory. After all, the law is also consistent with a 
very different theory. The law may view us as libertarian souls not bound by the 
laws of physics. Our choices may be viewed as somehow special, occurring outside 
the boundaries of the natural world. 
If the law is rooted in certain libertarian conceptions of responsibility, then it is 
vulnerable to the kind of neuroscientific evidence Greene and Cohen discuss. The 
view that we are libertarian souls is threatened as neuroscience becomes more 
powerful and comprehensive. The better neuroscience becomes, and, as Greene and 
Cohen suggest, the easier it is for us to visualize neuroscientific mechanisms, the 
less we are inclined to rely on souls to understand human behavior. Consider a 
judge who believes that all people act because of first-moving decisions they make 
in their souls. Such a judge may start to question whether someone really has 
“intent” to kill when the judge subsequently comes to understand intentions in 
mechanistic terms. 
Imagine a set of laws governing the handling of a particular chemical. Under 
one interpretation, the laws protect the public because the chemical is toxic. Under 
another interpretation, they conserve the chemical because it is exceedingly rare. So 
far, the law is consistent with both theories, and we don’t know yet whether the law 
is fundamentally committed to one theory or the other (or neither). But suppose 
new evidence suggests that the chemical is actually quite plentiful. If lawmakers 
passed the legislation under the mistaken view that the chemical was rare, then they 
will likely change or eliminate restrictions on its handling. Alternatively, if 
lawmakers acquiesce in the face of new evidence, courts interpreting the legislation 
are likely to either adopt the chemical-is-hazardous interpretation or else do what 
they can to minimize the impact of pointless legislation. Either way, evidence that 
challenges fundamental legal assumptions can alter the law and its interpretation.  
Similarly, criminal law seems consistent with both Morse’s compatibilism and 
soul-based libertarianism. To the extent that new evidence or vivid displays emerge 
that convince people to question mechanism, they are likely to either: (1) treat the 
law as fundamentally compatibilist and insulated from evidence demonstrating the 
mechanistic nature of the universe, or (2) become free-will skeptics and radically 
rethink the nature of responsibility. The second choice would, of course, feed into a 
revolution in the legal treatment of responsibility. 
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In his most recent work, Morse explicitly admits that current law is consistent 
with both compatibilism and libertarianism but dismisses libertarianism as 
“extremely implausible in the modern scientific age.”68 When assessing the 
likelihood of a responsibility revolution, however, we must separate normative 
views about what the law should assume from more objective interpretations of 
what law actually does assume. Morse candidly acknowledges that “[m]ost 
criminal justice actors are probably implicitly libertarian and believe that we 
somehow have contra-causal free will.”69 He does not, however, recognize that the 
views of such actors influence the proper interpretation of the law. If courts and 
lawmakers are soul-based libertarians, then the interpretation of criminal elements 
like “intent” are plausibly infected by soul-based libertarianism. The fact that soul-
based libertarianism seems implausible in the modern scientific age may give us 
reason to change the law but does not automatically alter centuries-old 
presuppositions that typically play a significant role in legal interpretation. 
One might think the view of responsibility underlying the law is not very 
important. Why care what people thought about responsibility centuries ago? If the 
law gets it wrong, the law can be changed. To the extent that views about free will 
are divided, however, and likely to stay that way for a long time, the current state of 
the law becomes quite important, especially when considering the likelihood of a 
responsibility revolution. 
B. Reasons to Doubt the Law Is Fundamentally Compatibilist 
There are at least four reasons to doubt that the law is fundamentally 
compatibilist. Indeed, they may even be reasons to suppose the law is 
fundamentally libertarian. First, as noted, most lawmakers have probably not been 
compatibilists. The law was crafted over centuries with contributions from 
thousands of people. For a long portion of that history, lawmakers likely held some 
version of a libertarian view about free will. They did not consider our choices 
subject to the ordinary forces of the universe. Rather, they considered us to have 
souls that make decisions quite independent of the physical world. Evidence of 
mechanism poses at least some threat to the libertarian worldview that plausibly 
underlies the legal system.  
Indeed, the Supreme Court of Michigan may have reflected a libertarian 
worldview in the nineteenth-century case of Maher v. People.70 The court sought to 
determine which provocative circumstances, like adultery, should mitigate what 
would otherwise be murder to a less severe conviction for manslaughter. The court 
said that the circumstances must be such that their “natural tendency” is to put a 
person in a heated emotional state that would interfere with the reasoning of an 
ordinary person.71 But the circumstances need only have the natural tendency to 
create that heated emotional state because—and here is the key point—it need not 
be “such a provocation as must, by the laws of the human mind, produce such an 
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effect with the certainty that physical effects follow from physical causes; for then 
the individual could hardly be held morally accountable.”72 In other words, if a 
person’s behavior is caused in the way that one physical entity causes another 
physical effect, then he cannot be held morally or legally accountable at all. While 
the statement in Maher could perhaps be given a compatibilist interpretation, at 
least taken literally, it seems to deny responsibility for mechanistic actions that 
follow with certainty from physical effects.73  
One case hardly generalizes to the entire corpus of law. Still, the criminal law 
was largely devised by people who held libertarian views like those in Maher. 
When did the law change its official position? Some empirical evidence, though it 
is controversial, suggests that most people naturally hold libertarian views.74 The 
authors of a leading criminal law casebook seem convinced not only that most of us 
are libertarians but that, contra Morse, the criminal law is libertarian as well: 
We tend to regard a person’s acts as the product of his or her choice, 
not as events governed by physical laws. This view (roughly, the 
hypothesis of free will and the rejection of determinism) is of course 
hotly contested in philosophical literature. But whether accurate or not, 
the assumption of free will reflects the way most people in our culture 
respond to human action, and it reflects, most importantly, the premise 
on which notions of blame in the criminal law ultimately rest.75 
If these authors are correct, the law embodies the false view that human decisions 
are independent of the mechanistic physical world. To the extent that science 
corrects that view, law may be amenable to the changes Greene and Cohen 
envision.  
More research is surely warranted into the views of judges and legislators 
concerning the law’s notion of responsibility, both now and over the last several 
hundred years.76 But absent such research, Morse too quickly denies the possibility 
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that the law is embedded with soul-based libertarian presuppositions and too 
quickly denies that current law is vulnerable to Greene and Cohen’s claim that 
neuroscience will change how people understand blame and responsibility.  
Second, the mere fact that criminal statutes are framed around folk 
psychological concepts like belief and intention77 reveals little about the law’s 
fundamental presuppositions. The law may speak in terms of beliefs and intentions 
because it takes us to have souls with nonmechanistic beliefs and intentions. Even 
free will skeptics can marshal consequentialist reasons for framing statutes in terms 
of beliefs and intentions: they are much easier for us to understand and apply than 
terms describing the behavior of neurons or the motion of molecules. Statutes refer 
to “automobiles” not because we deny that cars are composed of tiny molecules 
held together by a variety of forces but simply because “automobile” is a much 
simpler way to describe the entity we care about.  
Third, the law of evidence fails to reveal the law’s fundamental views on free 
will. True, judges do not admit evidence that merely shows a person’s behavior was 
caused. But this fact is ambiguous. If the law takes it as an article of faith that 
human decisions are made by libertarian creatures, we disallow evidence seeking to 
prove otherwise precisely because such evidence would be inconsistent with a 
fundamental premise of the legal system. Moreover, particularly in the sentencing 
phase of death penalty cases, courts are willing to permit a very broad class of 
evidence about the causes of a defendant’s behavior, even when the alleged causal 
path does not involve a traditional justification or excuse.78 And if the law tolerates 
this broad class of evidence in capital cases, it is not obvious why it should be 
excluded in others. Hence, the law may be ambivalent or confused about precisely 
how evidence of causation ought to bear on punishment. 
Fourth, statutes are virtually always silent on fundamental issues of free will. 
Morse states that “perusal of any American criminal code or judicial opinions will 
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confirm the absence of libertarian free will as a genuine criterion” of criminal 
responsibility,79 but the search will also fail to identify explicit support for 
compatibilism. Moreover, if I am right that law has historically been crafted by 
libertarians who predated the mechanistic view of the universe common among 
scientists today, we might not expect the law to state its explicit libertarian 
assumptions. Such views were simply fundamental to lawmakers and voters. By 
contrast, if the law changed course at some point in time, the shift would likely 
have been explicitly noted in cases or statutes: silence favors the libertarian 
interpretation of the law. 
Thus, we are left with multiple plausible ways of understanding the law, some of 
which are more insulated from Greene and Cohen’s concerns than others. Almost 
certainly, today’s legal and social institutions allow for the possibility of moral 
responsibility, and these institutions would present tremendous obstacles to the 
kind of revolution Greene and Cohen envision. Indeed, if a judge were forced to 
decide a case today that required him to make explicit the law’s deep, fundamental 
assumptions about responsibility, the judge would likely find Morse’s approach 
quite attractive. The judge could declare the law compatibilist in nature and thereby 
avoid overturning centuries of criminal law. But—and here is my central claim—
such a judge would be selecting or even shifting the law’s fundamental 
assumptions rather than simply deciding based on established law. Hence, we 
cannot confidently assert that current positive law is a major obstacle to the 
changes Greene and Cohen envision. 
C. Who Has the Radical Critique? 
Morse distinguishes between “internal” and “external” critiques of the law. 
Internal critiques accept the basic view of responsibility implicit in the law and 
simply seek modest reform within that framework.80 Free will skeptics like Greene 
and Cohen, however, offer what Morse deems an external critique of the law.81 
They propose not merely to tweak our understanding of responsibility but to 
abandon the notion of responsibility that represents “the law’s official position.”82 
For Morse, the fact that a critique is external seems to make a rhetorical point. 
If, for example, you think that mere causation excuses, you are making a radical, 
external claim about the law. But I have shown that the law’s view of responsibility 
is at least as likely to be libertarian as it is to be compatibilist. If it turns out that the 
law makes soul-based libertarian presuppositions, then it is Morse who offers a 
radical critique of the law because, as a mechanist, Morse would disagree with a 
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fundamental feature of such a legal system: namely, its denial of mechanism.83 In 
that case, Morse would not merely believe that we need to tweak the law’s 
conception of responsibility, but that we ought to abandon it entirely.  
Morse’s preferred criminal statutes would superficially look the same whether 
the law is fundamentally compatibilist or soul-based libertarian. Laws would be 
framed in familiar folk-psychological terms like “believe” and “intend” instead of 
neuroscientific terms like “neuron” and “synapse,” and they would allow for 
attributions of responsibility. So, at first, it might not seem to matter whether the 
law is compatibilist, as Morse thinks, or libertarian, as I have claimed is quite 
possible.  
But superficial appearances aside, the differences are deep and fundamental. 
Morse believes people can be responsible even when their actions follow 
mechanistically from circumstances beyond their control. By contrast, the law 
plausibly embodies the view that we are only responsible when our self-caused 
souls cause us to act. If science convinced us that there are no souls, the law’s 
criteria for responsibility would never be satisfied. Thus, Morse and the legal 
system may reach very different conclusions. 
In sum, neither Greene and Cohen nor Morse purport to offer a novel solution to 
the problem of free will. While Greene and Cohen defend an interesting prediction 
about how neuroscience is likely to shift our views of responsibility, they have yet 
to make a persuasive case for it. Morse believes the law is insulated from Greene 
and Cohen’s critique but downplays other more vulnerable interpretations of 
positive law. If a court were forced to decide, they would likely find Morse’s 
compatibilist approach hard to resist. But such a court would be making law rather 
than merely deciding in accordance with established law. And to the extent that the 
views of lawmakers may change in the manner Greene and Cohen suggest, then our 
future views about the nature of responsibility are still anybody’s guess. 
III. A TECHNOLOGICAL NEUROLAW REVOLUTION 
The prospects for a revolution in the legal treatment of responsibility, I have 
argued, are still quite hazy. A clearer case can be made for a neurotechnology-
driven legal revolution. Some caution is in order first: predictions of technological 
change have a poor track record. In the 1970s, many predicted that by now we’d all 
own flying cars and periodically vacation on the moon. The rate of 
neurotechnological progress is hard to predict, influenced by such varied factors as 
general economic productivity, research funding priorities, global politics and 
conflict, fundamental limits on our ability to understand and manipulate the brain, 
and much more.  
The difficulties of prediction aside, there is no general agreement as to what 
pace of legal change constitutes a revolution. Has DNA evidence revolutionized the 
criminal justice system? Even if we could perfectly predict in the 1970s how DNA 
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would be used in cases today, we might still disagree about whether DNA 
revolutionized the law.  
Legal revolutions are also difficult to individuate. For example, many of the 
changes I foresee in the law relate to emerging forms of brain imaging. But we 
already use brain images in the courtroom far more often than we did, say, forty 
years ago.84 It is entirely unremarkable when evidence from computed tomography 
(CT) scans or structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) is used to demonstrate 
brain trauma from automobile accidents or child abuse.85 Has a revolution already 
occurred? Will the use of new brain imaging techniques in court constitute a 
revolution or just a century-long upward trend in the forensic use of diagnostic 
images? 
Stephen Morse has issued a plea for “neuromodesty,” arguing that claims about 
how neuroscience will change the law have been exaggerated.86 He quotes a 2002 
editorial in The Economist which warned that “[g]enetics may yet threaten privacy, 
kill autonomy, make society homogeneous and gut the concept of human nature. 
But neuroscience could do all of these things first.”87 According to Morse, the 
effect of neuroscience on the law is being overhyped, just as the effect of genetics 
and other fields were overhyped before it: 
The genome was fully sequenced in 2001, and there has not been one 
resulting major advance in therapeutic medicine since. Thus, even in its 
most natural applied domain—medicine—genetics has not had the far-
reaching consequences that were envisioned. The same has been true 
for various other sciences that were predicted to revolutionize the law, 
including behavioral psychology, sociology, psychodynamic 
psychology, and others. This will also be true of neuroscience, which is 
simply the newest science on the block. Neuroscience is not going to do 
the terrible things The Economist fears, at least not for the foreseeable 
future.88 
Morse is right that gene therapies have been slower to develop than many 
expected, but it is too soon to be pessimistic and too soon to discount the 
technology’s eventual effects on the law. The cost of DNA sequencing has declined 
exponentially since the Human Genome Project began in 1990.89 We can now 
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sequence an entire human genome for $5000, and some expect the cost to 
eventually approach that of a routine blood test.90 In just the last couple of years 
since Morse published his comments, we can now sequence the fetal genome from 
a maternal blood test and a paternal saliva specimen.91 Therapeutic advances have 
been slow but they look promising.92 We still await a revolution in gene-related 
therapies, but reduced costs will surely speed medical and technological 
breakthroughs.  
Moreover, the link between brains and behavior is more direct than the link 
between genes and behavior. So the impact of neurotechnology on the law may 
chart a steeper curve than the impact of genetic technology on the law. And 
technically speaking, by bemoaning the slow progress of genetic technology, 
Morse is actually supporting the quoted statement in The Economist, since it makes 
a comparative claim that neuroscience will impact society more quickly than 
genetics research. 
Nevertheless, Morse is surely correct that neuroscientific advances are often 
overhyped. Most of his concerns are directed at Greene and Cohen and fellow 
travelers who predict radical revisions to our conception of responsibility. I, of 
course, have argued that Greene and Cohen have yet to persuasively support their 
predictions. In that sense, I suppose I support Morse’s call for neuromodesty.  
But I am more optimistic than Morse about the pace of neurotechnological 
progress. It is sometimes said that we overestimate the rate of technological change 
in the near term but underestimate technological change in the long term.93 Thirty 
years ago, it would have seemed immodest to predict the many ways in which 
personal computers and the Internet have already transformed society and the law. 
And just five years ago, it might have seemed immodest to predict that we could 
use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to predict with eighty percent 
accuracy whether or not a particular experimental subject is in pain. Yet, as I will 
discuss, we can do just that, at least in controlled experimental contexts.94 Some 
neuro-immodesty may be justified.  
Furthermore, many of Morse’s concerns about the state of neurotechnology will 
gradually be ameliorated. For example, Morse notes that fMRI studies should have 
more subjects with more varied demographics.95 These concerns will gradually 
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abate as scanning becomes cheaper, enabling studies with more subjects and greater 
population diversity. 
Morse also notes that many neuroscience studies have been plagued with errors 
in design.96 Indeed, neuroscientists have been embarrassed on too many 
occasions.97 But the methodological problems in the use of brain-scanning 
technology will gradually be identified and eliminated, as is the hallmark of good 
science.  
Moreover, some of the recent embarrassments are less applicable to what I call 
“black box” experiments. In black box experiments, we focus on the outcome 
relevant to the legal system and can largely ignore the underlying details of how 
brain images are interpreted. For example, to determine if some brain-based form 
of lie detection works, we check how accurately a person blinded to a subject’s 
truthfulness can successfully use the technology to assess his credibility. It need not 
matter precisely which portions of the brain are involved in deceit provided that 
some mysterious black box process detects credibility with sufficient consistency 
and in a wide enough variety of contexts that we are confident the results apply to 
real-world settings. Detailed understanding of the neural pathways of deception 
may aid application to the real world, but it is not a sine qua non. Jurors use seat-
of-the-pants techniques to detect lies despite limited evidence about how these 
techniques work and their success rates. We cannot hold brain-based lie detection 
to unrealistic standards. The technology will be helpful so long as it helps jurors 
reach better conclusions than they would without it. Thus, some of Morse’s 
criticism can be blunted, at least a bit, for certain forensic uses of neurotechnology.  
Finally, Morse and I may agree completely about the pace of technological 
change but simply look at different distances along the horizon. All it takes to 
radically change the pace of neuroscientific progress is a substantial improvement 
in the imaging techniques we use. If one’s predictions about the pace of 
neurotechnological progress assume we are using the same imaging techniques in 
thirty years that we use today, then those predictions are far too conservative.  
With all the foregoing caveats, I predict that there will be a technological 
neurolaw revolution and suggest ways in which the law and legal practice will 
change in coming decades as neurotechnology improves. The revolution that I 
envision cannot be easily characterized in a large book, let alone a brief article. The 
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potential of just new pharmaceuticals to cure disease or enhance our abilities is 
staggering.98 I will focus, instead, on three rather distinct trends that may give a 
sense of the kinds of changes we will see.  
Since I criticize Greene, Cohen, and Morse for offering too little evidence to 
support their predictions, I am wary of being subject to the same criticism. So my 
only formal prediction is that new brain-related technologies will dramatically 
transform the law in the coming decades, and I believe I provide enough evidence, 
albeit in abbreviated form, to make that case. I cannot fully defend here my 
predictions of the more precise changes we will see, so I will treat them merely as 
plausible hypotheses. 
A. The Experiential Future 
The first hypothesis is that we will move toward what I call our “experiential 
future.”99 In the experiential future, we will have better methods of assessing 
experiential states like physical and emotional pain, sadness, anxiety, and so on. 
The legal system will change because we will consider new forms of evidence at 
settlements and trials, and we will have good reason to reconsider existing laws that 
make it harder to recover damages for emotional rather than physical distress.  
Consider a recent study from Sean Mackey’s lab at Stanford University that I 
briefly alluded to earlier.100 Eight people were examined in an fMRI scanner. In 
some conditions, they were exposed to a painful heat stimulus while in others they 
were exposed to no painful stimulus at all. The scanner recorded brain activity in 
the different conditions, and a computer algorithm identified patterns between brain 
activity and pain exposure. Later, sixteen entirely new subjects were scanned. Each 
entered the scanner and under some conditions was exposed to a painful heat 
stimulus and under other conditions was not. Applying what the machine learned 
from the original subjects, it predicted with about eighty percent accuracy when 
individual subjects in the second group were in the pain or no-pain condition. 
The result is particularly remarkable because, unlike fMRI studies that only 
compare groups of subjects, researchers in this study assessed the pain state of 
particular individuals. And they did so without having already put those particular 
individuals into a scanner to gather background information specific to them. It is 
not hard to imagine using such a technology in the future to help determine whether 
a litigant’s pain is entirely malingered. It might also help us better understand the 
experiential states of people who have dementia or otherwise cannot communicate 
clearly.  
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There are still many caveats, of course. The research was done on college 
students of similar age. It examined a particular kind of pain on a particular part of 
the body and ignored countermeasures a subject might use to fool people. Still, if a 
plaintiff claims that he had a slip-and-fall injury in the defendant’s grocery store 
and now his knee hurts every time he bends it, it is not farfetched to imagine that 
emerging neurotechnologies will help us evaluate the claim. 
Neuroscientists have also made progress in finding neuromarkers for chronic 
pain. Marwan Baliki and colleagues were recently able to distinguish a group of 
subjects with chronic back pain from a group of subjects without chronic back pain 
by examining activity in the brain’s nucleus accumbens when participants were 
exposed to acute pain.101 The researchers suggest that people with chronic back 
pain experience acute pain differently than those who do not have chronic back 
pain and that the differences provide a signal that “distinguishes the two groups at a 
very high rate of sensitivity and specificity, implying that this signal can be used as 
an objective marker of chronic pain.”102 While the research speaks to groups of 
people and not individuals, we will quite plausibly find distinguishing biomarkers 
of chronic pain at the individual level in the near future. 
It is much easier to determine whether or not a person is experiencing pain than 
to assess its intensity. But we can learn at least something about pain intensity by 
examining brain activity. The amount of activation in certain regions of the brain 
increases with the intensity of a painful stimulus.103 Such findings suggest that 
brain imaging could someday shed light on the amount of pain a person is 
experiencing. 
If at least some of the technologies I discuss continue to improve, then we will 
eventually see dramatic changes in the sorts of evidence presented in tort cases, 
disability hearings, and workers’ compensation cases. Neuroscientific evidence of 
pain could support a claim that a person was injured in any of these venues. 
Moreover, at least in tort law, the intensity of pain is quite relevant to damage 
assessments. According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, fact finders are 
supposed to estimate fair and reasonable compensation for pain and suffering by 
noting “such factors as the intensity of the pain or humiliation, its actual or 
probable duration and the expectable consequences.”104 Tort law does not rely on a 
fixed schedule of compensation, such as $10,000 for the pain of a broken arm or 
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$20,000 for the pain of a broken leg, nor does it rely on weeks of compensation in 
the way that workers’ compensation programs do.105 Rather, we are supposed to 
actually measure amounts of pain and suffering despite the conceptual and 
technological difficulties of doing so.106 
If we are able to better estimate the intensity of painful experiences, we might 
switch to more standardized methods of awarding damages for pain.107 Doing so 
would require the law to address many new questions. For example, pain has 
sensory, affective, and evaluative components,108 and we might have to decide how 
to aggregate these values. Relatedly, people tolerate pain to different degrees and 
that should arguably be taken into account when awarding damages. The law has 
generally ignored such issues because we have so little ability to distinguish 
different aspects of pain. Perhaps we’ll have more options in the experiential future. 
Whatever the specifics, our laws and legal practices will respond to dramatic 
changes in the way we understand and measure pain. 
Researchers are also developing more objective ways of assessing experiences 
other than pain. For example, chronic stress and depression are associated with 
structural and functional changes in the brain.109 People with phobias have atypical 
brain metabolism and patterns of electrical activity.110 And the diagnosis of a 
variety of mental illnesses, like schizophrenia, anxiety disorders, and bipolar 
disorders, may be aided by brain imaging.111  
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Among other uses, these technologies could someday help us more accurately 
assess emotional pain in court. The law currently employs a variety of doctrines to 
limit recoveries for emotional distress. To recover, some jurisdictions require 
evidence of a physical manifestation of the emotional distress, like vomiting, or 
some kind physical impact that was concurrent with the emotional distress,112 and 
some jurisdictions require that the emotional injury occur within a zone of 
danger.113 Part of the reason for these limitations is that not every negligent 
infliction of distress warrants state intervention and compensation. But part of the 
reason is that courts are skeptical of hard-to-measure emotional distress claims.114  
As I have argued elsewhere in more detail,115 new technologies may eventually 
spark revisions to aspects of current law that limit recovery for emotional distress. 
During the centuries in which the common law developed, there was little we could 
do to measure subjective experiences so we often ignored them or downplayed 
their significance. In the experiential future, however, we will have new methods of 
understanding and assessing experiences and good grounds for modifying the law 
to better take them into account.  
Indeed, a number of jurisdictions are already loosening policies that limit 
emotional distress claims.116 One case in Michigan offers a particularly interesting 
peek at the experiential future. In Allen v. Bloomfield Hills School District,117 
Charles Allen was operating a train at approximately sixty-five miles-per-hour 
when it collided with a school bus that maneuvered passed the lowered gate 
blocking the tracks.118 When the train came to a stop, Allen ran back to the bus and 
was told that, though there were no children on the bus, the driver was seriously 
injured.119 Allen developed post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and sued the 
school district alleging negligent operation of a government-owned school bus.120 
The case turned on the interpretation of a Michigan statute that waived 
sovereign immunity of local government entities when their officers, agents, or 
employees cause “bodily injury” through the negligent operation of a vehicle.121 
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Allen claimed his PTSD constituted a “bodily injury” (an expression left undefined 
by the statute) “because the accident caused physical damage to his body as 
evidenced by a positron emission tomography (PET) scan of his brain.”122 The 
doctor who interpreted the PET scan claimed it showed “decreases in frontal and 
subcortical activity consistent with depression and post-traumatic stress 
disorder.”123 The Michigan Court of Appeals was ultimately persuaded that the 
plaintiff offered sufficient evidence of bodily injury to survive summary judgment 
because he presented “objective medical evidence that a mental or emotional 
trauma can indeed result in physical changes to the brain.”124 
One can criticize aspects of the court’s decision. We don’t need a PET scan to 
know that PTSD is associated with physical changes in the brain. PTSD causes 
recurring fear symptoms, so it presumably has some physical representation in the 
brain. Nevertheless, the court’s decision to treat an emotional injury as a bodily 
injury may anticipate the experiential future, for there is probably no good policy 
reason to waive sovereign immunity for physical injuries but not mental injuries 
except that mental injuries are more difficult to prove and are easier to exaggerate 
or fake. As diagnostic imaging techniques improve and give us more objective 
evidence of mental distress, we will have less justification for entrenched laws that 
make it harder to recover for emotional injuries than physical ones. 
B. More Privacy Laws but Less Privacy 
Researchers are working on a variety of technologies aimed at what can loosely 
be referred to as mind reading. For example, based on measurements of brain 
activity, researchers can make pretty good guesses about what images are shown to 
a subject in a brain scanner, be it a still image125 or even, to some extent, a video.126 
One recent study demonstrated that subjects under fMRI can be taught to mentally 
spell words in a manner that can be decoded in real time by researchers,127 a 
technique that could prove especially helpful for people with locked-in syndrome 
or other conditions that make it difficult to communicate. Neuroscientist Jack 
Gallant predicts that “[w]ithin a few years, we will be able to determine someone’s 
natural language thoughts using fMRI-based technology.”128 
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These new brain imaging techniques point to a future where our thoughts will 
not be as private as they are now. We will not read minds directly in any spooky 
sense, but we will continue to get better at identifying correlations between brain 
activity and mental activity and using brain activity to make predictions about 
mental activity.  
Legal scholars have focused their attention on efforts to develop more accurate 
lie detectors. Brain-based methods of deception detection are still in the early 
stages. Much of the research compares the brain activity of a group of “honest” 
subjects relative to a group of “dishonest” subjects.129 More helpful research to 
determine whether a particular person is lying is beginning to accumulate, but the 
testing has always been done in somewhat artificial contexts.130 If we put aside 
concerns about how well these experiments apply to real-life contexts, most 
published studies report using fMRI to distinguish honesty and deception at 
accuracies “between 70% and slightly over 90%.”131 
But even if we develop a lie detector that works well with the cooperative 
subjects that tend to participate in experiments, very little research examines the 
possible countermeasures people could take to fool such a device. One fMRI study 
was 100% accurate in detecting the lies of individual subjects, but accuracy fell to 
33% when subjects used countermeasures they were trained to apply.132 So even 
though at least two companies have marketed brain-based methods of lie 
detection,133 many neuroscientists are skeptical of the current state of the 
technology.134 Indeed, two recent attempts to introduce fMRI evidence of deception 
in court were unsuccessful.135 
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Nevertheless, deception detection has so many potential uses that the incentives 
to improve it are quite strong. Someday, the technology will at least be a useful aid 
in assessing credibility. When that day comes, many questions will be raised about 
how, if at all, the technology should be used in court. The real question we ought to 
ask ourselves when considering some supposed lie detector is: will we tend to get 
more accurate outcomes with or without it?  
The answer may depend on the context. Lie detection evidence offered by 
prosecutors to provide evidence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt would have to 
be extremely accurate, while lie detection evidence offered by a defendant to 
generate a reasonable doubt could be much more imperfect.136 Deciding whether or 
not brain-based lie detection will improve outcomes, however, will put us in an 
awkward position: we will have to compare the error rates of lie detection 
technology to our current technology, namely, the jury, and we know relatively 
little about how well juries assess credibility. What we do know is that people are 
not very good at detecting deception,137 and there is little correlation between 
people’s confidence in their ability to detect deception and their accuracy.138 Our 
entrenched preference for jury decision making is largely a result of the path of 
history, rather than an empirically validated conclusion about how good juries are 
at discerning credibility. 
In an opinion in United States v. Scheffer,139 Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by 
three other Justices, wrote that a rule banning all polygraph evidence in military trials 
serves the legitimate government interest of preserving jurors’ “core function of making 
credibility determinations in criminal trials.”140 According to Thomas, “[a] fundamental 
premise of our criminal trial system is that ‘the jury is the lie detector.’”141 His remarks 
admit the possibility that even perfectly accurate lie-detection evidence could be 
excluded from the courtroom on the ground that it would infringe the province of the 
jury.  
In my view, excluding accurate lie-detection information to protect the province of 
the jury makes a mockery of the justice system. The most important role of trials is to 
uncover the truth as best we can. To do so, we ought to use the best technology that 
cost-effectively helps us do so. There are legitimate concerns that poor quality lie 
detection evidence could irrationally sway jurors. They may not understand how the 
technology works or how to interpret known rates of error. But it would be foolish to 
keep some high-quality future lie detector out of the courtroom—under a blanket rule—
simply because credibility determinations have traditionally been made by jurors. 
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Of course, even a perfectly accurate lie detector could not usurp all jury functions. 
Some cases do not depend on credibility assessments at all. For example, whether or not 
conduct was consistent with that of a reasonably prudent person cannot be determined 
by a lie detector alone. Moreover, when cases do depend on witness credibility, there is 
an important difference between honesty and truth. Honest assertions are not 
necessarily true. A person may believe he committed a crime that, in fact, never 
occurred. Similarly, a dishonest assertion can turn out to be true. A gunman may believe 
he fired the coup de grâce shot that ended the life of a rival gang member. Denying that 
he killed the rival would be dishonest, even if unbeknownst to him, the deceased was 
already dead before he fired.  
If direct attempts at brain-based lie detection fail, other mind reading efforts may still 
prove helpful. The technologies discussed in the preceding section on the experiential 
future can serve as indirect methods of lie detection by telling us whether a person’s 
pain claims are likely to be false. (In fact, pain measurement techniques could give us 
information that cannot be obtained from truthful subjects. Even when a person 
honestly reports his pain as “9” on a scale of 1 to 10, we cannot easily compare his 
report to those of others.) 
Researchers are improving their understanding of other experiences, as well, 
including sexual arousal. One study examined the brain activity of male pedophiles and 
male non-pedophiles when shown images of nude children.142 Researchers used brain 
activity to accurately classify the pedophilia status of more than 90% of subjects.143 
While this technique may be subject to countermeasures, it may be less so than other 
techniques used to classify pedophiles.144 Another study looked at the brain activity of 
subjects while they looked at male and female human genitalia.145 Researchers could 
determine sexual orientation with more than 85 percent accuracy.146  
Of course, all of this work on mind reading raises privacy concerns. The pedophilia 
research suggests that fMRI could someday be used to assess the likelihood that a 
person has committed or will commit a sex crime. The research on sexual orientation 
could potentially bear on the distribution of assets in a divorce or the way prisoners are 
segregated. Other neuroscientific research may uncover conscious or unconscious racial 
biases.147 People could be scanned for one purpose, say, to see how an advertising 
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campaign affects their brains, while they inadvertently generate information that bears 
on their racial biases, sexual orientation, and other sexual preferences. One group of 
researchers recently demonstrated that the very simple electroencephalography (EEG) 
sensors in certain mass-market video games can already be used to make plausible 
inferences about gamers’ private “information related to credit cards, PIN numbers, the 
persons known to the user, or the user’s area of residence,”148 and may enable more 
confident inferences as these sensors improve.149  
Brain imaging may even inform questions about mens rea. It might help us 
assess a person’s capacity to generate some mental state or bear on the credibility 
of a person’s statements about his past mental states. Brain imaging might even 
have more direct applications. For example, one group of researchers is trying to 
use fMRI to identify the culpable mental states described by the Model Penal 
Code.150 Imagine a border crossing where someone is transporting a suspicious 
container. Before opening it, we could scan the brain of the person carrying the 
container to see if his brain is consistent with a culpable mental state of knowledge, 
recklessness, or negligence with respect to its contents. (The person might have to 
believe he was randomly selected for screening so that the mere fact of being 
selected does not significantly alter his beliefs.) 
Accurate mind-reading technologies would raise a host of questions: For 
example, when, if ever, could prosecutors use brain-based lie detectors to 
incriminate or defendants to exculpate? How would police and other investigators 
use such tools? Could they be used by employers to make hiring and firing 
decisions?151 
Even if accurate mind-reading techniques are still decades away, we already 
have reason to think about their implications because of what I call the 
technological look-back principle.152 If we develop an accurate lie detector thirty 
years from now, you can be asked in 2044 about your conduct today in 2014. When 
you are in such a scanner in 2044, your spouse could ask if you have ever been 
unfaithful, and the police could ask if you have ever killed someone. And just as 
campaigning politicians often make their tax returns public even though they are 
under no legal obligation to do so, voters may expect politicians to go into a 
scanner and tell them what their intentions really are and whether or not they have 
ever acted corruptly. 
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I am not arguing that we need legislation today to prepare for all of the potential 
future uses of mind-reading techniques.153 We would have little confidence that 
such legislation would survive the intervening period or that it would it take the 
appropriate form. Moreover, we often worry too much about the privacy concerns 
raised by new technologies in ways that unnecessarily hinder their development.154  
But those expecting to be alive in coming decades or who care about those who 
will should begin to think about the privacy implications of mind-reading 
technologies. Many who shed their DNA while committing crimes before DNA 
sequencing became common are now in prison, prosecuted with evidence they 
never imagined could be used against them. Our memories may become the 
evidence that embarrasses or incriminates us in the future. 
I offer two general predictions about how our rights to privacy may change in a 
world with better mind-reading technology. First, as the preceding suggests, we 
will have less mental privacy as advances in neuroscience make it easier to infer 
thoughts and thought patterns. We strike a balance between the societal value of 
making information public and the value to a person or group of people of keeping 
it private. These costs and benefits push and pull each other to reach a certain 
equilibrium. Neuroscience will reduce the costs of obtaining otherwise private 
information and will likely enable access to information that would otherwise be 
unavailable. Given that societal demand for information is likely to stay the same 
or increase, the equilibrium is likely to shift toward more information gathering.  
In the days before the Internet, one could hire a private investigator to learn 
about people’s occupations, family members, and various likes and dislikes. Today, 
such information is frequently easy to obtain. Indeed, many people publicize it 
themselves on social networking sites. Even when people try to keep their own 
information private, their associates still generate information about them. As 
technology makes information easier to obtain, it becomes harder to keep private.  
Second, I speculate that we will craft more laws to protect thought privacy. 
Right now, there is little we can do to penetrate the thoughts of people who prefer 
to keep them secret. Only when we have plausible methods of doing so will we 
fully see the need to create laws to protect thought privacy. For example, as 
polygraphs became more reliable and widespread,155 Congress passed the Federal 
Employee Polygraph Protection Act in 1988 to prohibit most private employers 
from subjecting employees to polygraphs and other forms of lie detection.156 And 
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just as we have seen an onslaught of laws to protect electronic privacy,157 we will 
see new laws directed at protecting the privacy of our thoughts. Laws addressing 
rights to read minds or to be free of mind reading will grow more prevalent, 
complex, and controversial in a world with more accurate neurotechnology. Hence, 
we will have more law protecting thought privacy but less actual thought privacy. 
C. Concretization of the Law 
Not all neurolaw relates to neurons. Broadly construed, neurolaw also addresses 
legal issues raised by nonhuman forms of intelligence. Over the last few decades, 
progress in artificial intelligence has generally been viewed as a disappointment.158 
The consensus is beginning to shift, however, as researchers are making 
tremendous advances in speech recognition, language translation, face recognition, 
and more that are beginning to affect the average person. For example, Apple 
iPhones have a digital assistant named Siri that can process a wide range of natural 
language expressions,159 and IBM’s Watson computer dominated two human expert 
Jeopardy! players using technology now being tested in hospitals for its ability to 
advise healthcare practitioners.160 Computers are still ill-equipped to tackle many 
basic cognitive tasks,161 but at tasks where they do excel—sifting through 
enormous amounts of data on the Internet, for example—they can dramatically 
surpass human abilities. 
One of the most revolutionary new uses of artificial intelligence with the 
promise of radically changing our lives and the law comes from efforts by Google 
and other companies to develop self-driving cars. Google has built a fleet of 
vehicles that has logged more than 500,000 miles of travel under no human control 
or limited human control, including plenty of driving in high-traffic conditions.162 
Since these cars can travel without passengers, we can imagine a vast network of 
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shared autonomous vehicles parked throughout a city. When you need a car, you 
simply access the network and wait for the nearest available car to pick you up. 
The technology behind autonomous vehicles is rapidly improving.163 The chief 
executive of Nissan Motor Company predicts that self-driving vehicles will go on 
sale around 2020.164 Progress has been so quick that Google successfully lobbied 
for legislation in Nevada to allow self-driving vehicles on the road for testing 
purposes.165 California passed a law which, among other things, requires its 
department of motor vehicles to come up with rules for self-driving cars by 2015,166 
and legislation related to self-driving cars has been enacted or is under 
consideration in several other states.167  
While it may seem dangerous to ride in an autonomous vehicle, Google has had 
no accidents with cars running in self-driving mode.168 So even though there is 
some danger in driving an autonomous vehicle, it will eventually be safer than 
driving ourselves. According to one observer describing a Google test car: 
[It] begins to seem like the Platonic ideal of a driver, against which all 
others fall short. It can think faster than any mortal driver. It can attend 
to more information, react more quickly to emergencies, and keep track 
of more complicated routes. It never panics. It never gets angry. It 
never even blinks. In short, it is better than human in just about every 
way.169 
Semiautonomous and eventually more fully autonomous vehicles and other 
robots will become increasingly common, and they will need to be programmed to 
respond to a virtually infinite array of events and circumstances. More pervasive 
use of artificially intelligent entities will have systematic effects on the law and its 
interpretation. One speculative possibility is that the law will “concretize,” by 
which I mean that it will become more clearly expressed and more transparently 
applied. Here are three ways in which the law may concretize.  
First, laws on the books may converge more closely with the legal norms we are 
actually expected to follow. Most laws are principally interpreted by humans: there 
are lots of vague laws, but we often have a shared understanding of their meaning 
and how they are meant to be applied. Ideally, rules for autonomous entities would 
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not require them to have human attitudes or understand human conventions. On the 
other hand, if we can develop self-driving cars that recognize pedestrians, road 
debris, and traffic signs, cars can surely recognize that it is generally permissible to 
drive a few miles-per-hour above the posted speed limit.  
A more significant push to concretize may emerge from corporations that design 
self-driving cars. They will fear the accident liability from even de minimis vehicle 
infractions, like driving a little bit above the speed limit. Thus, the law may 
concretize as corporations push for convergence between laws on the books and the 
laws that we are expected to follow. More concretized speed limits, for example, 
may be somewhat faster than those we have now but with more strict enforcement 
around the limit. 
Second, the law may become more concrete as computers play a larger role in 
making legally relevant decisions. For example, a group of German researchers is 
working to develop a computer system “to make automatic decisions on child 
benefit claims to the country’s Federal Employment Agency . . . probably with 
some human auditing of its decisions behind the scenes”170 and is in talks with the 
agency about how to deploy it.171 One researcher “hopes that one day, new laws 
will be drafted with machines in mind from the start, so that each is built as a 
structured database containing all of the law’s concepts, and information on how 
the concepts relate to one another.”172 In other words, when legally relevant tasks 
are performed by computers,173 legislation may itself be crafted more 
algorithmically to facilitate processing. That is a kind of concretization although 
whether or not such laws are clearer than current laws may be a matter of taste (and 
of whether you’re a human or a computer). 
Third, the law might concretize by creating greater pressure to clarify the 
theoretical underpinnings of the law. For example, many copyright holders already 
use automated software systems to scan the Internet looking for copyright 
violations.174 Some users make constitutionally protected “fair use” of others’ 
copyrighted material,175 but it is difficult to know precisely what constitutes fair 
use. Before the Internet age, copying audio, visual, and written materials was more 
difficult, so there was less need to police violations. Furthermore, it was more 
expensive to police each violation when you could not simply search for violations 
on the Internet. Thus, fair use determinations were made less frequently. In the 
Internet age, such determinations are made much more frequently, and there is 
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more political pressure to understand the principles underlying fair-use doctrine in 
order to make the law more concrete.176 
In the future, such pressures may apply to some of the most central questions 
facing moral and legal philosophers. Consider the tricky theoretical issues that 
underlie the famous trolley thought experiments:177 A runaway trolley is heading 
toward five entirely innocent people who are, for some reason, strapped to the 
trolley tracks. If the trolley continues along its current path, all five will die. You 
can flip a switch to divert the trolley to an alternate track, but it will still kill one 
innocent person strapped to the alternate track.  
This trolley problem and its numerous variations raise interesting questions 
about when it is mandatory or permissible to take an action that will save several 
lives, when the action will also knowingly cause the death of some smaller number 
of people. There is no consensus solution to all trolley problems. Nevertheless, 
autonomous agents, especially unmanned military drones,178 will likely be 
confronted with real-life trolley problems. We will want these entities to follow 
rules of some sort, but we cannot program those rules unless we agree on what they 
should be. It is possible that we will have different rules for humans and 
nonhumans, but we will at least have to codify some rules for autonomous 
machines that will require more theoretical clarity and agreement than we have 
today.179  
Of course, humans already face trolley-like situations from time-to-time, and we 
still do not have clear rules to follow. The difference, however, is that after humans 
have confronted an emergency situation, there is usually quite a bit of uncertainty 
about what they knew and when they knew it. With autonomous entities, we will 
know more precisely what information the entity had available to it and how it was 
processed. Indeed, we will typically have video footage of the pertinent events, 
along with all of the other data available to the entity. Being clear about the rules is 
more important when we can no longer hide behind ambiguous facts. 
Quite independent of neuroscience and artificial intelligence, the law may 
already be concretizing. As more laws and regulations are created and cases are 
decided, the law’s interstices may be shrinking. It is surely difficult to measure 
what I am calling the law’s concreteness. But if the law is concretizing already, I 
hypothesize that the rate will increase, at least a bit, as autonomous machines 
become more prevalent. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 176. According to one source, “copyright ‘bots’ don’t have the ability to take fair use into 
account.” Dayal, supra note 174 (quoting Kembrew McLeod). On the contrary, however, it 
seems more likely that bots could take fair use into account, even if it’s an open question as 
to how well they could make the determination relative to humans. Either way, more 
concretized rules about fair use would make the job of copyright-enforcing bots easier. 
 177. See, e.g., Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect, 
in VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 19, 23 (1978); Judith 
Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395 (1985). 
 178. See generally Nick Paumgarten, Here’s Looking at You: Should We Worry About 
the Rise of the Drone?, NEW YORKER, May 14, 2012, at 46. 
 179. See, e.g., Patrick Lin, The Ethics of Saving Lives with Autonomous Cars are Far 
Murkier Than You Think, WIRED (July 30, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/opinion
/2013/07/the-surprising-ethics-of-robot-cars/. 
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CONCLUSION 
The emerging field of neurolaw addresses two major topics that have only 
limited overlap. The “neurolaw of responsibility” concerns how neuroscience will 
and should affect laws related to responsible action. It was traditionally addressed 
by punishment theory and the philosophy of action. The “neurolaw of technology,” 
by contrast, concerns the ways the law will and should respond to new brain-related 
technologies. It covers issues traditionally addressed by applied ethics. Both topics 
require familiarity with law and neuroscience, but they otherwise examine rather 
different issues. Nevertheless, since both fields happen to involve law and 
neuroscience, the neurolaw moniker seems to have stuck.  
Greene, Cohen, and Morse write principally about the neurolaw of 
responsibility. They spend much of their energy defending their substantive views 
about free will, though none of them purport to offer a new argument to break the 
free will impasse. Greene and Cohen also claim that advances in neuroscience will 
change the way we think about punishment, but they have yet to persuasively 
defend the claim. Similarly, Morse may be right that we ought to understand the 
law in compatibilist terms, but current law may be rooted in contrary assumptions.  
While prospects for a responsibility revolution remain hard to predict, I claim 
that there will be a technology-driven neurolaw revolution. The law will change in 
many ways, and I focus on three hypotheses: (1) the differences in how the law 
treats emotional and physical injuries will diminish as neuroscientists develop more 
objective methods of identifying and assessing emotional injuries; (2) new methods 
of “mind reading” will lead us to have less thought privacy but more thought 
privacy laws; and (3) as autonomous and semiautonomous machines become more 
integrated into human life, they will have systematic effects on the law and its 
interpretation, perhaps by increasing the concretization of the law. The precise 
details of how technology will develop are hard to predict, but by trying to predict 
the path of technology, we can hope to make the law better prepared for the 
changes to come. 
  
